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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Toni LeClercq appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional 
guilty plea to misdemeanor DUI. Specifically, LeClercq challenges the order 
denying her motion to suppress evidence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged LeClercq with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p. 5.) Part of the 
state's probable cause was a breath alcohol test of .141/.143 percent. (R., p. 7.) 
LeClercq filed a motion in limine and an amended motion in limine and/or motion 
to suppress breath alcohol testing evidence. (R., pp. 10-1 1; 14-1 5.) After a 
hearing, the magistrate found that the officer attempted to stop LeClercq for 
speeding; LeClercq did not immediately stop but instead crossed over a double- 
yellow line; after managing the stop the officer smelled a strong odor alcohol from 
the vehicle and from LeClercq; LeClercq was "alternately confused, apologetic, 
argumentative and unable to find the appropriate information for the officer"; and 
that LeClercq admitted to drinking wine and failed the HGN and one leg stand 
field sobriety tests. (R., pp. 56-57.) The officer explained to LeClercq he would 
use a portable breath machine to test her breath alcohol concentration after a 
fifteen minute waiting period. (R., p. 58.) During that time, LeClercq asked three 
times if she could refuse the test. (Id.) The magistrate found that: 
The first time, [the officer] told her to first listen to the advisory form. 
The second time he told her "You can refuse, but I would take you 
to the hospital and we would do a forced blood draw" and went on 
to explain that Idaho state law said he could forcibly take her blood 
if she did not submit to the breath sample because of the implied 
consent law. The third time, he again stated that he would take her 
to the hospital for blood; that she would receive a refusal; and that 
her license would be lost for one year. 
(R., p. 58.) The magistrate concluded that the officer's actions were permissible 
and denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp. 56-62.) The parties reached a plea 
agreement whereby LeClercq entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her 
right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp. 71-77.) The 
magistrate entered a withheld judgment against LeClercq. (R., p. 77.) LeClercq 
appealed and the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision. (R., pp. 81-82; 
130.) LeClercq timely appealed the district court's decision. (R., pp. 135-137.) 
ISSUE 
LeClercq did not set forth a concise statement of the issues on appeal. 
The state asserts the issue on appeal as: 
Has LeClercq failed to demonstrate error in the denial of her motion to 
suppress the results of her alcohol breath test? 
ARGUMENT 
LeClercq Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's Denial Of Her 
Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
LeClercq claims that her consent to breath alcohol testing was not 
voluntary because the officer informed her that he would have a blood sample 
taken if she did not consent to the breath test. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-17.) 
LeClercq's argument fails for three reasons. First, because LeClercq gave 
implied consent her actual consent (and the voluntariness thereof) is irrelevant to 
the admissibility of the breath testing. Second, because the officer's statement 
that he would pursue an involuntary blood draw was within the scope of the 
officer's constitutionally available investigative methods, his statements to her 
that he would pursue such further investigation if LeClercq refused was not 
constitutionally coercive. Finally, LeClercq's reliance on Idaho statutes 
governing refusals is misplaced because she did not refuse. LeClercq has failed 
to demonstrate that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's decision 
denying her motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." Id. 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." (citing Losser, 145 
ldaho at 670; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 ldaho 559, 633 P.2d 1 137 (1 981)). "The 
standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 141 ldaho 728, 
729-730, 117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005). Conclusions of law are subject 
to free review. Riley v. Rowan, 131 ldaho 831, 833, 965 P.3d 191, 193 (1998). 
C. LeClercq Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's 
Appellate Ruling On The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress 
LeClercq has failed to establish that the district court erred in upholding 
the magistrate court's decision denying her motion to suppress. LeClercq's 
breath test results were admissible pursuant to Idaho's implied consent statute 
and were not the product of unconstitutional police coercion. 
The administration of an alcohol concentration test is a seizure of the 
person and a search for evidence under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); State v. 
DeWitt, 145 ldaho 709, 711-712, 184 P.3d 215, 217-218 (Ct. App. 2008). 
However, alcohol concentration testing pursuant to Idaho's implied consent 
statute is a well-recognized exception to the general rule that searches and 
seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. DeWitt, 
145 ldaho at 712, 184 P.3d at 218; See also State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 
P.3d 739 (2007); State v. Nickerson, 132 ldaho 406, 410, 973 P.2d 758, 762 (Ct. 
App. 1999); I.C. § 18-8002(1). 
Under ldaho law, there is no legal right to refuse an alcohol concentration 
test when there are reasonable grounds for the request and the test is conducted 
in a reasonable manner. State v. Harmon, 131 ldaho 80, 952 P.2d 402 (1998). 
Even if the defendant is not notified of the consequences of refusal as required 
by I.C. 5 18-8002(3) the results of the evidentiary test will be admissible in a 
criminal prosecution. Id., 131 ldaho at 85, 952 P.2d at 407. The failure to advise 
a suspect of the consequences of refusal would be significant only with respect 
to the administrative, license suspension following a refusal. State v. DeWitt, 145 
ldaho 709, 184 P.3d 215, n. 4 (Ct. App. 2008). In fact, ldaho courts have long 
recognized that while a driver has no legal right to refuse testing, the legislature 
enacted the license suspension statute in recognition of a driver's physical ability 
to refuse to submit to a breath test and that the statute was designed to 
discourage and civilly penalize such a refusal. DeWitt, 145 ldaho at 713, 184 
P.3d at 219 (citing State v. Woolerv, 116 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989).) 
In State v. Nickerson, 132 ldaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1999), a 
case similar to LeClercqls case, the defendant was told that because he was on 
parole he could not refuse the breath alcohol test and that if he refused he would 
go back to prison; the defendant argued that these comments were coercive and 
rendered his consent to a breath alcohol test involuntary. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument stating that the "argument that his consent to the 
BAC at the police station was involuntary is of no consequence because he had 
impliedly consented as a matter of law." Id., 132 Idaho at 410, 973 P.2d at 762. 
The court went on to note that "although an individual has the physical ability to 
prevent a test, there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent." 
Id. The court concluded that "consent at the police station, whether voluntary or 
-
involuntary, is superfluous, for actual consent at that point is unnecessary to the 
lawfulness of the procedure or the admissibility of the test results." 
LeClercq's argument on appeal is that the breath test results should have 
been suppressed because the implied consent statute does not specifically 
authorize telling a DUI suspect "that blood will be forcibly drawn" and if an officer 
"makes that type of threat" the breath test is "coerced, and the results should be 
suppressed." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Because the question of coercion is 
legally irrelevant when the breath test is the result of implied consent, Nickerson, 
132 Idaho at 410, 973 P.2d at 762, this argument fails. 
Even if LeClercq's consent argument were legally relevant, it still fails 
because she has failed to show that any actual consent was the result of 
coercion. As the magistrate correctly noted in this case, to reach the conclusion 
proposed by LeClercq the court "would have to determine that if you are given a 
choice of two tests and you take the first, the evidence is suppressible, but if you 
take the second, it is not suppressible. Logically, either both are suppressible or 
neither is suppressible. Consistent with Diaz, neither is suppressible." (R., p. 60 
(citing State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007)).) By informing 
LeClercq of his intent to follow a valid and allowable course of investigation if she 
refused to cooperate with the breath test required by her implied consent, the 
officer did not coerce her consent - he merely gave her the choice of two 
perfectly legal means by which he would acquire the evidence to which the state 
was entitled. 
Merely informing a suspect that the officer intends to pursue a legal 
means of obtaining evidence if consent is not granted does not coerce consent. 
State v. Garcia, 143 ldaho 774, 152 P.3d 645 (2006). In Garcia, the defendant 
moved to suppress evidence obtained in a search of his vehicle. Garcia, 143 
ldaho 774, 152 P.3d 645. He claimed that his consent to search was not 
voluntary because the officer had threatened to arrest him based on probable 
cause existing before the search. (Id.) The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating 
that: 
bowing to events, even if one is not happy about them, is not the 
same as being coerced. The voluntariness of consent is not 
impaired simply because one is faced with two unpleasant choices, 
which here, Garcia argues, was choosing between consenting to 
the search and allowing the marijuana in his truck to be discovered 
and not consenting and risking arrest of himself and his 
companions. 
Garcia, 143 ldaho at 779, 152 P.3d at 650. The court further explained that an 
officer's implied or explicit offer not to arrest someone if he "turns over what he 
has" is not coercive if it merely "informs the suspect of the officer's intention to do 
something that is within the officer's authority based on the circumstances." 
Garcia, 143 ldaho at 779-780, 152 P.3d at 650-651. Because the officers 
actually had probable cause to arrest Garcia, the statement was an informational 
communication regarding authority the officers actually possessed and "did not 
ips0 facto render Garcia's consent involuntary." Garcia, 143 ldaho at 780, 152 
P.3d at 649. 
In this case it is undisputed that the officer had probable cause to request 
alcohol testing from LeClercq. (a qenerallv, Appellant's brief.) Therefore, the 
officer's statements to her that he could obtain a blood sample if she did not give 
a breath test were statements communicating authority that the officer actually 
possessed. See State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007); State v. 
Worthinnton, 138 ldaho 470, 65 P.3d 21 1 (Ct. App. 2002). As in Garcia, the fact 
that LeClercq was faced with two unpleasant choices did not impair the 
voluntariness of her decision and the statements by the officer did not ipso facto 
render her consent involuntary. In short, the statements made by the officer 
were not coercive in the constitutional sense. See State v. Smith, 144 ldaho 482, 
488-89, 163 P.3d 1194, 1200-01 (2007) (officer's statement of intent to seek 
search warrant not coercive where not false statement of authority to obtain 
warrant); State v. Ballou, 145 ldaho 840, 848-49, 186 P.3d 696, 704-05 (Ct. App. 
2008) (officer's statement of intent to get warrant if consent not granted not 
coercive where officer had probable cause and could have obtained search 
warrant). 
Finally, LeClercq's argument fails because it is ultimately unsupported by 
the authority she relies upon. For example, LeClercq's reliance upon cases 
involving civil administrative license suspensions to support her position is 
misplaced. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 7-1 0 (citing Matter of McNeel~, 1 19 ldaho 
182, 804 P.2d 91 1 (Ct. App. 1990); Matter of Virqil, 126 ldaho 946, 895 P.2d 182 
(Ct. App. 1995); Matter of Beem, 11 9 ldaho 289, 805 P.2d 495 (1991).) A driver 
has no legal right to refuse testing; the legislature enacted the license 
suspension statute in recognition of a driver's physical ability to refuse to submit 
to a breath test and that the statute was designed to discourage and civilly 
penalize such a refusal. DeWitt, 145 ldaho at 713, 184 P.3d at 219 (citing State 
v. Woolery, 1 16 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 121 0 (1 989).) The failure to properly 
advise a suspect of the consequences of refusal is significant only with respect 
to the administrative license suspension following a refusal. State v. DeWitt, 145 
ldaho 709, 184 P.3d 215, n. 4 (Ct. App. 2008). Even if the defendant is not 
properly notified of the consequences of refusal as required by I.C. § 18-8002(3) 
the results of the evidentiary test will be admissible in a criminal prosecution. 
State v. Harmon, 131 ldaho 80, 85, 952 P.2d 402, 407 (1 998). 
Likewise, LeClercqls reliance on case law from Texas and Colorado is 
misplaced. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-15 (citing Erdman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 
890, 893 (Tx. App. 1993); Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563 (Colo. 2007).) 
Colorado law has an express consent law which gives persons suspected of 
driving under the influence additional rights that they do not have in Idaho, 
including the right to choose the method of testing. Turbvne, 151 P.3d at 568. 
Where a defendant chose the blood test, Colorado's express consent law "did 
not authorize the arresting officer to require Turbyne to take a breath test . . . ." 
Turbyne, 151 P.3d at 571. Thus, suppression of the breath test was required 
because the officer's threat of a license suspension for not cooperating with the 
breath test was illegitimate. Turbvne, 151 P.3d at 571-72. 
Similarly, under Texas law, if a person suspected of driving under the 
influence refuses an evidentiary test, "none shall be taken." Erdman v. State, 
861 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tx. App. 1993). Under Texas law, "a suspect's refusal to 
provide a breath sample must be strictly honored." Id. Thus, even true 
statements that exert "psychological pressure" to submit to the test violate the 
Texas statute and require suppression of the evidence. Id. at 893-94. 
These cases from Colorado and Texas, therefore, were interpreting far 
different statutes than are before this Court. What constitutes a violation of 
those statutes -- refusing to honor the suspect's choice of tests and applying 
pressure when the suspect enjoys the right to absolutely refuse testing - is 
simply inapplicable here because the Idaho statute confers no such rights on 
LeClercq. 
LeClercq has failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress 
the results of her breath test. The officer's statements were irrelevant to her 
implied consent. Even if relevant the statements did not amount to improper 
coercion. Finally, LeClercq's authority is irrelevant as it goes to either the license 
suspicion for a refusal (which did not happen in this case) or to the allowability of 
police conduct under statutes very different from Idaho's. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying LeClercq's motion to suppress and affirm her judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 9th day of June 201 0. 
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